December 1: François Tanguay-Renaud (York University) 3:30 to 5:00 pm in DSB/B107 “Policing Necessity” Abstract: to follow To view the full roster of speakers, please visit our Speaker Series page.
“Plato’s Phaedo: Are the Philosophers’ Pleasures of Learning Pure?”
Abstract: My question in this paper is whether the philosophers’ pleasures of learning in the Phaedo are pure of pain……
Graduates of philosophy programs perform better than peers on medicine, law school and other post graduate degree entrance exams.
Abstract: Applying a medical conception of toxicity to speech practices, this paper calls for an epidemiology of discursive toxicity……
“Disagreement, Deep Time, and Progress in Philosophy”
Abstract: The recent literature in the epistemology of disagreement examines the question of how one ought to respond to awareness of epistemic peer disagreement about her belief that P….
“On what there is, what there isn’t, and none of the above”
Abstract: It is a philosophical commonplace that logic and metaphysics have been closely related disciplines “from the beginning.” The close relationship has survived…..
LSNA CONFERENCE 2017 – The Eleventh Annual Conference of the Leibniz Society of North America, co-hosted by the University of Toronto and McMaster University in Toronto on October 13–15, 2017.
October 27: Doreen Fraser (University of Waterloo) 3:30 to 5:00 pm in DSB/B107 “The non-miraculous success of formal analogies in physics” Abstract: When physicists develop a successful new theory, philosophers often infer that the new theory is approximately true in some respects. This is the core intuition of scientific realism, captured by the ‘no miracles’ argument: that success…
The 2017 Ontario Legal Philosophy Partnership Philosophy of Law Conference “BEYOND THE STATE – Governance, Legality, and Political Morality” takes place Thursday, September 28 to Sunday, October 1, 2017 (Burlington, Ontario).
“Davidson’s Treatment of Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Paradox” Abstract: The aim of this paper is first to show that Wittgenstein and Davidson both argue for semantic non-reductionism, the rejection of any account of meaning that does not invoke semantic notions, in similar ways …